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THIS article is the first of a series addressed to the problem:
What is the effect of the arrival of the maturity day of the cus-
tomer's time note which had been discounted for him by his bank
and credited to his account upon the bank's obligation to him to
honor his checks? In this context the problem calls for an
answer which is a statement of law. "Statement of law" might
be used to refer to norms to which it is believed judges should
conform or to existing rules with which they must comply. It
might be used to refer to a description of the judicial decisions of
the past or to forecasts of judicial decisions in the future. Such
forecasts might be intuitional judgments of particular situations
against the background of unanalyzed experience or they might
be the result of the application of the traditional method of law-
yers. In this article "statement of law" is used to refer to fore-
casts which are the result of the application of legal method.
This method is to circumscribe upon the web of experience a very
large number of complexes of events each one of which includes,
among many other things, the "facts" in a litigation and the de-
cision. From the bewilderingly numerous constituents common
to all the complexes the "facts" and the decision are isolated for
study. The "facts" are very roughly grouped on the basis of
similarity. If more often than not somewhat like "facts" are
accompanied by somewhat like decisions, generalizations are first
ventured and then pyramided into a system. In the course of
this process there appear the concepts of promise, consideration,
bargain, implied-in-fact promise, contract, quasi-contract, tort,
etc. Unfortunately the categories are very wide and loose. Con-
sequently, legal method is crude and its forecasts uncertain.
Nevertheless it is the only method lawyers have at their disposal.
All of them regularly employ it even when they pretend to rely
wholly upon intuition. Legal method is applied in this article.
In the subsequent articles the problem will be reinterpreted and
in its new guise faced again.
The problem is presented by the cases of Callaham v. Bank of
* Underhill Moore is a Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University, and
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A-nderson,1 Delano v. Equitable Trust Co.2 and Goldstein v. Jef-
ferson Title & Trust Co.3 The facts of each are taken to be those
stated in the official reports. In the first it was held that a com-
mercial bank's obligation to its checking account customer was
not reduced by the amount of a promissory note made by the
customer to the bank and discounted by it, though the note was
long past due, in the absence of notice that the bank had debited
the note to his account. In an action brought by the customer
for the dishonor of a check presented by a third person, a demur-
rer to the bank's answer setting up the maturity of the note as a
defense was overruled. In the second case, again an action by
the drawer for dishonor of a check presented by a third person,
the reply having admitted the allegations of the answer that the
defendant held an overdue note which had been discounted for
him, the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings was
granted. It was ruled that the maturity of the note reduced or
at least gave the bank a power to reduce its obligation by the
amount of the note even in the absence of notice to the customer
that his account had been debited. In the third case, an action by
the drawer for dishonor of a check presented by a third person
on the morning of the day of maturity, facts similar to those
pleaded in the'Callaham and Delano cases appearing by uncon-
tradicted evidence, a judgment for the defendant was granted on
a motion non obstante veredicto. The court formulated a rule
like that stated in the Delano case. The view taken by the New
York and Pennsylvania courts and the dissent in the Callaham
case is well stated in the following language appearing in the
dissenting opinion:
"It is undoubtedly the general rule that a bank is bound to
honor the check of its depositor if it has sufficient funds of the
depositor to pay the check when presented, because of the im-
plied a geement to do so, arising from the relation of the parties.
The ordinary relations between the depositor and the bank is that
of creditor and debtor, respectively, to the extent of the deposit,
and while the relation so stands, the rule broadly stated above
applies; but if, when a check is presented, the relation is altered,
and the depositor is debtor to the bank on some material obliga-
tion upon which the bank would have a right of action against
the depositor, then manifestly it is just that the bank should
be allowed the right to set off the past due indebtedness of the
depositor against its liability on the general deposit, as if the
depositor were then suing the bank on account of the deposit. To
hold otherwise would be to deny to a bank the same right of set-
off accorded to all other persons between whom there exists mut-
ual demands. This right of the bank with respect to general de-
' 69 S. C. 374, 48 S. E. 293 (1904) (lower court decision allowed to stand
as upper court evenly divided).
2 110 Misc. 704, 181 N. Y. Supp. 852. (Sup. Ct. 1920).
3 95 Pa. Super. Ct. 167 (1928).
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posits, which is sometimes called a lien, is more accurately the
right of set off, for it rests upon, and is co-extensive with, the
right to set off as to mutual demands." 4
It will be observed that in none of these cases was the matured
note pleaded by way of set-off or counterclaim. Had it been it
would be clear that the note would serve merely to reduce the
amount of the plaintiff's recovery and would not necessarily
preclude a recovery. The rules for the measure of damage in
an action for dishonor permit the recovery of the amount of the
check 5 with interest," consequential damages in contemplation of
the parties,7 and damages for the injury resulting to the plain-
tiff's credit arising from the knowledge of third persons that his
demands upon his banker have been refused -a sum which
4 69 S. C. at 381, 48 S. E. at 295. Cf. Delano v. Equitable Trust Co.,
supra note 2, at 705, 707, 181 N. Y. Supp. at 853, 854: "The relation of
banker and depositor creates the relation of debtor and creditor. The
depositor's money is taken by the bank in the nature of a gratuitous loan,
and thereupon the bank charges itself with a debt absolutely due to the
depositor. And this is so though the bank were to lose the money without
fault. Where a depositor is indebted to his bank there exists a mutual
ifidebtedness, and the right of setoff applies. Both the banker and de-
positor hold as debtors the moneys of their creditors, and the right of
either to make application to the debt of the credit is determinable by
the ordinary rules of law relating to the right of setoff. Such rules of
law between a bank and its depositor are the same as those applicable
to other parties.
.. . In no case in this state to which my attention has been called has
it been decided that the right of setoff by a bank can only be exercised
after notice. The well understood and generally accepted relations exist-
ing between banker and depositor neither as matter of law or custom call
upon the bank to notify the depositor that his account has reached or
is about to reach such a state as to require replenishing before he at-
tempts to further draw against it. And the ordinary obligations exist-
ing between debtor and creditor do not demand notice to the maker of a
note that the same is due. The debtor knows, or should know, what he
owes and when it is payable." Compare the similar statement in Goldstein
v. Jefferson Title & Trust Co., upra note 3, at 109.
5 Chicago Marine & Fire Insurance Co. v. Stanford, 28 Ill. 168 (1862);
Levine v. State Bank, 80 Misc. 524, 141 N. Y. Supp. 596 (1st Dep't 1913);
Winkler v. Citizens State Bank of Geuda Springs, 89 Kan. 279, 131 Pac.
597 (1913).
6 Winkler v. Citizens State Bank of Geuda Springs, supra note 5; 17
C. J. 818; ENG. Cxv. PRoc. ACT, 3 & 4 WM. IV, c. 42, § 28 (1833); ILL. Rv.
STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 74, § 2.
'Kleopfer v. First National Bank, 65 Kan. 774, 70 Pac. 880 (1902).
sDishonor because of error in computing balauce: DeLaunay v. Union
National Bank, 116 S. C. 215, 107 S. E. 925 (1921) ; Dyson v. Union Bank
of Australia, Ltd., 8 Vict. L. R. 106 (1882); McFall v. First National
Bank of Forrest City, 138 Ark. 370, 211 S. W. 919 (1919); First National
Bank of Forrest City v. IcFall & Co., 144 Ark. 149, 222 S. W. 40 (1920);
Schaffner v. Ehrman, 139 Ill. 109, 670, 28 N. E. 917 (1891); Siminoff Y.
Goodman & Co. Bank, 18 Cal. App. 5, 121 Pac. 939 (1912); Spiegel v.
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may be in excess of the amount of the note even though the check
be for a less sum.
It will also be observed that the courts in the last two cases
justify their conclusion that the note gives rise to a defense on
the ground that a banker's set-off is a defense. But why a
banker's set-off should be a defense while the set-offs of other
persons are not is not indicated.
It may be that those who speak of banker's set-off have in mind
a rule that the amount of the bank's obligation equals the balance
of the current account, i.e., the difference between the sum of
the payments by customer to bank and the sum of payments by
bank to customer, and that they are assuming that the proceeds
of the discount of the note though paid against checks are not
an item on the credit side of the current account. If this were
true, it is clear that the customer would not be obligated to pay
the amount of the note but that his obligation would be measured
by the debit balance.
It may be that those who say that a banker's set-off is a defense
are led to do so by the fact that in many actions by a customer
the only damages sought are the amount of the dishonored
order. Indeed in all of the cases in which a banker's set-off
is said to have this peculiai' effect, except those to which this
article is addressed, the customer was claiming no more than
his "balance;" in some the note was pleaded as a set-off, and in
others it is impossible to determine from the report whether the
customer's overdue note was pleaded as a set-off or defense.
That the suggested explanation accounts for the decision in the
only case of this type in which the report shows the distinction
between a set-off and a defense was urged upon the court is
strongly suggested by the brevity of the court's only observation
upon the point:
"It is not necessary to file a plea of set-off, to make this defenge.
The pleas filed were sufficient for that purpose. One of the pleas
was to the effect that the defendant bank was never indebted to
the plaintiff as alleged. Other pleas were to the effect that the
Public National Bank of New York, 184 N. Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1920);
Weiner v. North Penn Bank, Inc., 65 Pa. Super Ct. 290 (1916). Dishonor fm,
reason other than mistake (bank bona fide): American National Bank
v. Morey, 113 Ky. 857, 69 S. W. 759 (1902); Bank of Commerce v. Goos,
39 Neb. 437, 58 N. W. 84 (1894); First National Bank of Hutchinson v.
Kansas Grain Co., 60 Kan. 30, 55 Pac. 277 (1898); Meinhart v. Farmers
State Bank, 124 Kan. 333, 259 Pac. 698 (1927); IRolin v. Steward, Public
Officer of the East of England Bank, 14 C. B. 595 (1894); Westeson v.
Olathe State Bank, 75 Colo. 340, 225 Pac. 837 (1924); 78 Colo. 217, 240
Pac. 689 (1925); Wildenberger v. Ridgewood National Bank, 230 N. Y.
425, 130 N. E. 600 (1921). Dishonor for reason other than mistake (ill
will): Commercial National Bank v. Latham, 29 Okla. 88, 116 Pac. 197
(1911) (sight draft).
9 7 C. J. 653,,n.84.
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defendant bank did not have in its possession the sum of $28,-
059.37, or any sum, deposited wvith it by Mason Young as re-
ceiver. These pleas were sustained by the findings of the court.
When it was shown that the bank held Young's notes as receiver
for an amount which equalled the deposits, and that the deposits
had been applied to the payment of these notes, a good defense
was proved under these pleas." "I
In such cases it is obvious that the plaintiff's obligation on the
note even if pleaded by way of set-off would prevent a recovery
by the plaintiff. The distinction between such a case and one in
which the plaintiff is entitled to damages beyond the amount of
his dishonored order has been overlooked. Consequently it has
become common to speak of a banker's set-off for the amount
of'the note as a defense.
11
To be sure, calling the customer's note a defense because it
gives rise to a banker's lien or banker's set-off suggests that
there is something peculiar in the relation of bank and customer
which justifies this surprising metamorphosis of a set-off into a
defense. But certainly the problem raised by the principal cases
is not resolved, but simply restated, by reference to banker's
set-off.
Before proceeding to the detailed analysis of the relation be-
tween bank and customer which the solution of the problem
requires, certain propositions which are assumed should be made
explicit. There are two classes of transactions between a com-
mercial bank and a checking account customer as a result of
which the bank comes under an obligation to make transfers
("payments" of one of the media of exchange) in the future:
(1) those in which the bank promises to make transfers in .ex-
change for transfers presently made by the customer and (2)
those in which it promises to make transfers in exchange for the
customer's promises to it. These two types of transactions, how-
ever, result in but one obligation. This obligation endures as
long as the bank's promises of either type continue to call for
performance. The amount of the bank's obligation equals the
sum of the amounts of the bank's promises which continue to call
for performance, both those given in exchange for transfers to it
and those given in exchange for promises to it.
These assumptions are implicit in the method employed in the
United States in writing up a customer's account in the bank's
individual ledger. Both loans and deposits are entered as credits.
Both matured loans and withdrawals are entered as debits. The
credit balance indicates the amount of the bank's obligation 2"
lo Durkee v. National Bank of Florida, 102 Fed. 845, 849 (C. C. A. 5th,
1900).
"Supra note 9.
1 KNIFFIN, COMMERCIAL BANKING (1923) 491, 599, 605, 761; DAVIs,
BANK ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT AND AccouNTs (1910) 94, 104-105.
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It should be observed, however, that this method of writing up
the individual ledger combines disparate transactions and refers
to both by identical symbols. The ledger account includes trans-
actions which are and others which are not'items in the current
account. The current account is a series of transactions each
one of which is a transfer of the medium of exchange either by
the customer to the bank or by the bank to or for the customer.
Thus, of the transactions described above, only those of the first
class are included in the transactions which go to make up the
current account. But the current account also includes transfers
made by the bank in performance of its promises of either class.
Thus the balance of the current account shows the difference
in the amount of the actual transfers. It is not necessarily a
measure of the obligation to pay. If there were no transactions
of the second class the balance would be the vector of the obliga-
tion to pay, indicating its direction and measuring its amount."
I. PROMISES BY A BANK GIVEN IN EXCHANGE FOR TRANSFERS
How methods of bank bookkeeping hide the fact that banks re-
ceive both transfers and promises to transfer has been noticed.
In addition and more important, the difference between transfers
to the bank of the media of exchange (deposit currency, federal
reserve notes, national bank notes, gold certificates, silver certifi-
cates, treasury notes, greenbacks, gold, silver and subsidiary
coin) and transactions in which the bank receives credit instru-
ments (notes made by customers, notes made by third persons,
and bills, accepted and unaccepted) is obscured.
The preference of lawyers for wide categories makes for the
same obscurity. Like the bookkeepers they too group the receipts
of a bank from its customers in order that they will not have to
differentiate the legal consequences of a discount from the legal
consequences of a deposit of the media of exchange. Thus they
say that when a note is discounted it is as if the bank had given
the customer the proceeds of the discounted note in cash and as
if the customer thereupon had deposited them.14  Sometimes
the grouping is justified by a subtler analysis. Thus in a recent
legal article it is said, "If a promissory note payable to a sol-
vent commercial bank .. .were discounted for the maker by
the bank and the price though due were not demanded by the
maker, the financial and legal consequences would be those of a
demand loan by maker to bank. If bullion, coins, bank notes,
or deposit currency were sold ... to a bank and the price not
13 LANGDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY- OF EQUITY JURISDICTION (2d ed. 1908)
114-115; Moore and Shamos, Interest an the Balance of Checking Ac-
counts (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 633-634.




demanded when due, the consequences would be those of a de-
mand loan." '1 On a subsequent page the authors say that the
discounting of a note is an item of the current account because
the failure of the customer to make immediate demand for the
proceeds is in effect a transfer of the medium of exchange to
the bank. 6
The difference, however, between transfers and promises to
transfer is obvious. No one, for example, would fail to observe
the difference of a transaction in which he exchanged a thousand
dollar bill for a twenty-year bond from a transaction in which he
exchanged a thousand dollar bill for ten one hundred dollar bills.
The distinction is made as a matter of course by bankers and
accountants when they list the media of exchange and the obliga-
tions of customers as separate items in the financial statement of
a bank. And the distinction may well be of importance.
It will be recalled that the assumption was made that in the
transactions in which the bank received transfers of the media
of exchange from the customer it promised to make transfers.
What are the terms of the promise? The promise of the bank,
whatever its terms may be, must be a promise which is implied
in fact; express promises are not made. If there were no current
account between bank and customer, the process of constructing
the promise would be to take account of the fact that a bank
is engaged not only in receiving but also in paying out the
medium of exchange and that it relies, though not exclusively,
on its receipts for the medium which it needs in its paying
operations. In order that the medium which it receives may
be available to effect its paying operations, the medium, must
be received to its use, as its own, and not as bailee or fiduciary.
Where there is a shift of the ownership of the medium from one
to another the promise which it is to be inferred, the transferee
makes is to transfer to the use of the transferor something
equivalent in value.- And where, as here, the transaction is
in a community where exchanges are effected by means of money,
the promise is to pay an equivalent in money to the use of
the payee. The exact equivalent would be a perpetual series of
interest payments at the current rate of interest.1" Approximate
equivalents are payment of an equal sum in the future with in-
terest in the meantime, and payment of an equal sum on demand.
Though payment of an equal sum on demand may not be an
exact equivalent in constructing the promise it is chosen because
a promise to pay such an equivalent, in view of the fact that ex-
change is almost exclusively effected by deposit currency, puts
15 Moore and Shamos, op. cit. supra note 13, at 633.
16 Ibid 646.
17 The transaction is a loan. Ibid. 633.
Is FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME (1906) 191-195, 202.
1931]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the transferor in a position most nearly like the one he sur-
rendered by making the payment. The reasons for the choice
of this equivalent have been elsewhere stated as follows:
"The principal motive of the customer who obtains the promise
of a bank to honor his checks and opens and maintains a current
account by the balance of which is to be gauged the bank's lia-
bility under its promise, is to secure R, supply of the common
medium of exchange, i.e., deposit currency in the checking ac-
count form. This the customer has secured the moment the
bank's promise is made and a sufficient balance established. The
bank's promise is the medium of exchange. The performance of
that promise by crediting the checking account of the payee
named in the customer's check, or by crediting the checking
account of a collecting bank employed by the payee, or by giv-
ing its own check on its correspondent, is commonly thought
of not as a performance of a promise, but as a step in the
transfer of the medium of exchange. To the parties the trans-
action which takes place whenever the customer make an ad-
vance on the checking account appears as a purchase rather
than a loan. Partly for this reason, the vast majority in num-
ber of checking accounts are not accompanied by a bargain for
the payment of interest by the bank. On the contrary, the
time deposit and the current account of the commercial bank
with a customer whose checks it has not promised to honor,
e.g., the "savings" account, are usually accompanied by a prom-
ise to pay interest. These are bargains in which the customer
is seeking investment. Furthermore they are made with a view
to payment or liquidation in the future; and in these two impor-
tant respects they differ from the bargain for the operation of
a checking account." 19
As a result of these considerations the implied-in-fact promise
would be found to be one which by its terms will continue to call
for performance until the promisor actually pays or transfers
of the medium of exchange are made. Such a promise would
be recognized as part of a unilateral bargain which imposes a
debt obligation upon the promisor.2
The fact that the transfer of the medium to the bank, however,
is a transfer which is only one in a series of similar transactions
between the commercial bank and its customer constituting the
current account must be considered in implying the promise.
The effect of the current account upon the promise implied-in-
fact is aptly described by Langdell:
"An agreement between two parties to set off cross demands
against each other may, however, relate to cross demands not
then existing, but thereafter to arise; and in that case it seems
that .the agreement will operate upon the cross demands and
cause their mutual extinguishment the moment they arise, pro.
vided neither of the parties have given any notice to the other to
19 Moore and Shamos, op. cit. supra note 13, at 636.
20 LANGDELL, op. cit. supra note 13, at 115.
[Vol. 40
DEBITING DIRECT DISCOUNTS
the contrary; for, in the absence of such notice, the parties will
be conclusively presumed to remain of the same min they were
of when the agreement was made, and therefore the effect will
be the same as if the agreement had been made at the moment
when the cross demands arose. It is as true, however, of such
an agreement as it is of an agreement to set off existing cross
demands, that it will seldom be made otherwise than by impli-
cation; and the implication in this latter case will generally
arise, if at all, from the nature and the course of the dealing
between the parties. Moreover, the agreement will arise the
moment it is called for by circumstances, i.e., the moment that
cross demands come into existence, and not till then; and as often
as new cross demands arise, a new agreement to set them off
against each other will arise. The cross demands, therefore, and
the agreement to set them off against each other, will always
co-exist, and hence there can be no doubt that the agreement will
operate upon the cross demands and cause their actual extin-
guishment ...
It is, it seems, on the principle just explained, that cross de-
mands between a banker and his customer extinguish each other.
Indeed, if there be cross demands between a banker and his cus-
tomer, there can be no doubt that they extinguish each other,
and they can do this only in the mode just explained or by
operation of law." 2-,
The promise of the bank can now be stated. In anticipation
of a series of mutual transfers of which the number, amount, and
date cannot be foreseen, the commercial bank and the prospec-
tive customer come to the understanding that if nothing to the
contrary be agreed at the time of each transfer by the customer
to the bank the receipt of each transfer shall indicate that the
bank bargains to pay to the customer upon demand the difference
between the sum of the transfers by the customer and the sum
of the transfers by the bank if the difference is in favor of the
customer.2
2
II. PROMISES BY THE BANK GIVEN IN EXCHANGE FOR PROMISES
In addition to transactions in which the bank receives medium
of exchange there are others in which the bank receives credit
instruments to which the customer is a party. These credit
instruments are instruments upon which the customer is the pri-
mary party and instruments upon which a third person is the
primary party and which are eventually paid by the third party.
The last class includes those which are drawn by or on a bank
and are paid by the bank upon which drawn and those drawn by
or on other persons. The credit instruments in which we are
interested are promissory notes made by the customer payable
to the bank. It will be recalled that in the principal cases the
-1 Ibid. 114.
2-2 M.-oore and Shamos, op. cit. supra note 13, at 633-634.
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note was a matured time note. The discussion therefore will be
directed to time rather than to demand notes.
What is the bank's promise where it receives the promissory
note of a customer? Here again, as in the case of a deposit of
the medium of exchange, the bank's promise must be found as
there is no express promise.
One of the sources from which a bank obtains the medium of
exchange necessary for the conduct of its business is the sale
of securities in which it has invested and upon which it can
realize immediately in the open market. In order that a bank
may be free to sell its investments the bank must own them.
A bank usually pays for its investments when it acquires them
and in the rare case where it does not, the promise implied-in-
fact is one to pay something equivalent in value, which in this
case is a sum equal to the current or market price of the credit
instruments purchased. 28
The customer's promissory note is a credit instrument in form
like those representing the long and short term investments
which the bank purchases.24 But the promissory note of a cus-
tomer is seldom sold 25 and indeed often is not salable in the
open market. A bank may occasionally use its customer's note
to raise money at its correspondent or at a Federal reserve bank.
Generally it does not.28 The fact that a bank rarely sells the
note whereas it usually sells investments indicates that a bank
need not acquire the ownership of the note. The note and the
investment are employed for different ends. The similarity in
form is misleading. Therefore the bargain in which the bank
acquires the note may well be different. It cannot be implied
in fact as in the bargains in which investment securities are
acquired that a bank when acquiring its customer's note is mak-
ing a promise to buy it.
But customers' promissory notes are sometimes used by the
bank as collateral. That of itself does not indicate that the bank
has bought the credit instruments. One who admittedly holds
a credit instrument as collateral security may and often does
assign the collateral with the obligation it secures as collateral
for a loan to him.
27
2
3AGGER, ORGANIZED BANKING (1918) 43, 48-51, 147; DUNBAR, THE
THEORY AND HISTORY OF BANKING (5th ed. 1929) 30, 36-37.
24 Aigler, Recognition of New Types of Negotiable Instruments (1924)
24 COL. L. Rev. 580-584; Crittenden v. Widrevitz, 272 Fed. 871 (C. C. A.
2d, 1921); Murray v. Wagner, 277 Fed. 32 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Crum v.
Hanna, 140 Va. 366, 125 S. E. 219 (1924); Dengler v. Paul, 83 Pa. Super.
Ct. 37 (1924); Pratt v. Higginson; 230 Mass. 256, 119 N. E. 661 (1918);
Utah State National Bank v. Smith, 180 Cal. 1, 179 Pac. 160 (1919).
25 AGGER, Op. cit. supra note 23, at 146, 151-152.
26 Ibid. 151-152, 283, 285-286; DUNBAR, op. cit. supra note 23, at 291-292.
27 Coleman -v. Anderson, 82 S. W. 1057 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904), aff'd, 98
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Again, though a bank may ultimately by means of payment
realize in the regular course of business the amount of notes
discounted for its customers and though it relies on such realiza-
tion for the necessary medium, this does not justify implying a
promise such as that given by the bank when it buys invest-
ments. On the contrary, this course of business shows the striking
similarity of a bank to a professional lender who in fact realizes
upon his loans in the same way and who, like the bank, also
looks to liquidation to supply him with the means to further
operations. Were repayment by the borrower the only way the
lender could realize on his loans he would not be said to have
"purchased" his borrower's promise to pay. That promise would
appear not as the bargain equivalent or consideration for the
money borrowed but rather as "collateral security" the redemp-
tion of which would be accomplished by the act of payment.
In the same way it might be said that the bank which realizes
by repayment on credit instruments discounted for its customers
has made loans to them and has taken their credit instruments
as "collateral" only.2s
The fact that the supposed lender could sell the promise would
not require any change in the conclusion reached unless it also
appeared that he had acquired it for purposes of sale. Where
this does not appear a subsequent sale would simply indicate
that he might have purchased. But even admitting that a sub-
sequent sale indicates a purchase, whether a purchase is to be
implied in any particular case would depend upon whether in
the usual course of business he sells such promises. For these
reasons it seems that neither a purchase by the lender nor a
purchase of a customer's credit instrument by a bank would be
implied.
The conclusion is that the receipt by the bank of the custom-
er's note is not sufficiently like a purchase of an investment to
find a promise on the bank's part to pay the face of the note
(less the discount, if any) as the "price"--to find a promise
which would result in a debt obligation. On the contrary, it
appears that the transaction is more like a bargain to make a
loan in which the credit instrument has been delivered but the
lender's promise has not yet been performed.
In such a bargain is the lender's promise to make the transfer
one which remains in force until performed, or is it a promise
which by its terms expires upon the failure of the borrower
Tex. 570, 86 S. W. 730 (1905); Waddle v. Owen, 43 Neb. 489, 61 N. W.
731 (1895).
2 Indeed, this is the assumption made in applying usury statutes to the
discount by a bank of its customer's note. International Bank of Coal-
gate v. Mullen & Mullen, 30 Okla. 547, 120 Pac. 257 (1911); Bank of the
United States v. Owens, 2 Pet. 527 (U. S. 1829).
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to request the transfer within a limited period? Certainly it
might be either. Regarding the note transaction as analogous
to an agreement for a loan, what should be implied as to the
period during which the bank's promise assures the customer
it will honor his orders? The note contains the express promise
of the customer to pay at a future day-a promise not conditional
upon the bank's honoring his orders. Such promise is in a form
calculated to obligate the customer to pay the note whether or
not the transfer has been made by the bank. In exchange for
such a promise, a promise by the bank unlimited in point of time
and not conditional upon payment of the note might be implied.
A bilateral bargain with independent promises would be the
result. If the customer failed to pay the note, the dishonor of
his check drawn and presented after maturity would give him
an action for damages. Of course a recovery might in effect be
prevented or at least the amount of the recovery reduced by a
counterclaim for the amount of the note. If the bank had re-
fused to make the promised transfer by dishonoring the cus-
tomer's check, it would, at maturity, have an action against the
customer as maker for the amount of the note; but its action
would be met by a counterclaim for a sum at least equal to and
perhaps more than that amount. One might be compelled in
such a situation to acquiesce in attaching such fundamentally
inconsistent and practically clumsy legal consequences to a bar-
gain compounded of specially formulated express promises ex-
pressly independent. But when they result from a bargain com-
prising a purely formal promise in a negotiable instrument on
the one hand and a promise wholly implied-in-fact on the other,
one is led to believe that he has not been successful in his efforts
to ascertain the bargain of the parties.
If no transfers of the medium had been requested by the cus-
tomer, there would have been no default upon the part of the
bank, for the bank's obligation to make transfers is conditional
upon an actual presentation of an order and demand. 2 There-
fore it seems the customer would have no set-off. Yet in an ac-
tion on the note, the bank may not recover as it is said the
customer has a set-off.30 It is absurd to call such a defense a
set-off. But *t would be equally absurd to permit the bank to
recover only to become in turn an obligor to the customer in
the same amount.
But suppose a promise by the bank unlimited in point of time
29 Brahm v. Adkins, 77 Ill. 263 (1875); Downes v. Phoenix Bank of
Charlestown, 6 Hill 297 (N. Y. 1844); Tobias v. Josiah Morris & Co., 126
Ala. 535, 28 So. 517 (1900); N. Joachimson v. Swiss Bank, [1921] 3 K. B.
110.
30 Puget Sound State Bank v. Washington Paving Co., 94 Wash. 504,
162 Pac. 870 (1917).
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but conditional upon payment of the note were found. Then
after the customer's default upon the note, the dishonor of his
check drawn and presented after maturity would not give him
an action against the bank. Nevertheless since the promise con-
tained in the note is unconditional, the bank notwithstanding its
default would have an action against him. The satisfaction of
the bank's judgment would, it seems, place the bank under an
obligation to honor his checks thereafter drawn and presented.
This surprising result might be avoided by depriving the bank
of its claim on the note because of the circuity of action its
enforcement would entail. But it appears even more surprising
to imply in fact a bargain the enforcement of which is refused
because of the absurdity of enforcing it according to its terms.
If it be supposed that the promise of the customer is that con-
tained in the note but that the promise of the bank is to make
transfers if demanded within a limited period only, the result
would be even more surprising. If the customer made no de-
mands within the period, the bank would recover upon the note
and the customer not only would have neither a set-off or counter-
claim nor a defense but also would never thereafter by demands
be able to subject the bank to a duty to pay.
It appears, therefore, that by taking the credit instrument
to state the customer's side of the bargain a sensible bargain
cannot be constructed. Whether the implied-in-fact promise of
the bank be assumed to be unlimited or limited in point of time,
unconditional or conditional, the bargain and the legal conse-
quences conforming to its terms would be absurd.
It is necessary, therefore, to look for the customer's promise
outside the promissory note. Both sides of the bargain must be
implied in fact. The bargain was made against the background
of a current account between the parties. Like all transfers be-
tween bank and customer, the transfers to the customer in pur-
suance of the note transaction are, in the absence of contrary
agreements, debit items in that account. 1 This is as true of the
transfer to the customer of the face amount of the note in one
sum at the time of discount as of any other transfer, and the
circumstance that the transfer follows immediately upon the dis-
count does not indicate an agreement that the transfer shall not
be a debit.32 It follows that the debit balance of the account
will include the transfers received as a result of the note trans-
action. And by virtue of the fact that the transfers to the
customer are upon his order or request and that they are con-
trolled by the understanding underlying the current account,
there is an implied-in-fact promise of the customer to make trans-
3 LANGDELL, op, cit. supra note 13, at 114-115; Moore and Shamos, op.
cit. supra note 13, at 633-634.
See Cumming v. Shand, 29 L. J. Ex. (N. S.) 129 (1800).
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fers to the bank in an amount equal to that by which its transfers
exceed his. This promise and its consequent obligation obviously
include the amounts transferred as a result of the note trans-
action. Consequently were it not for the matters of time of
reimbursement and interest there would be no reason for sup.
posing that the agreement implied-in-fact from the note trans-
action included any promise whatever on the part of the cus-
tomer. But a debit balance of the current account ordinarily
must be met forthwith by transfers from the customer.3 3 And
if, then, there were no agreement as to time of reimbursement
the obligation of the customer consequent upon the transfer in
pursuance of the note transaction would be due forthwith. In-
terest, were there no agreement, would certainly be restricted
to the amount actually transferred by the bank under the note
transaction; perhaps would not be allowed at all except as dam-
ages and if it were, might be at a rate different from the cus-
tomary or market rate.34 It must be supposed, therefore, that
the bargain implicit in the note transaction was one in which
there was a promise by the customer to reimburse the bank
in an amount equal to the debit balance on the day upon which
the note matures and to pay the interest stipulated therein.
As to the other terms of this promise what reason is there for
supposing them to be any different from those implied in the
case of transfers by the bank which are not in pursuance of a
note transaction, but nevertheless result in an extension of
credit, as in the case of unagreed-to-overdrafts? There is none,
for there are present in both situations the same parties, the
same background, and in both credit extensions are effectuated
by the honoring of checks without any express promise by the
customer at the time of the payment or transfer.
That this is the promise affords the most rational explanation
of the decision in Puget Sound State Bank v. Washington Pav-
ing Company.3 5 There the complaint was in form for a recovery
upon the note which had matured. Though it appeared that the
customer had not, by check or otherwise, demanded the credit
balance as shown in the individual ledger account (in which
there appeared a "credit entry" for the amount of the note) he
was permitted to counterclaim for the balance. Assuming that
the bank was obligated to make transfers up to the amount of
such credit balance only after actual demand, it had not de-
33 Bank of Statesville v. Waddell, 100 N. C. 338, 6 S. E. 414 (1888);
Earle v. Munce 133 Fed. 1008 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1904); Hennessy Bros. v.
Memphis Bank, 129 Fed. 557 (C. C. A. 6th, 1904); Lyon County Bank v.
Schaefer, 102 Kan. 868, 171 Pac. 1159 (1918).
" Moore and Shamos, op. cit. supra note 13, at 648.
35 94 Wash. 504, 162 Pac. 870 (1917).
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faulted.36 Therefore it seems impossible to sustain the decision
reducing the amount of the recovery by the amount of the balance
on the ground that the defendant had a counterclaim. But the re-
sult is obviously correct. It appears that the complaint and
counterclaim are clumsy attempts at pleading in an action of
equitable assumpsit. The judgment against the customer for
the amount of the note less the "balance" is a judgment for
the amount of the debit balance of the current account, i.e.,
the amount by which the bank's transfers to the customer ex-
ceeded the customer's transfers to it.
If the promise of the customer is to repay at a future day
the amounts transferred to him by way of loan insofar as his
transfers to the bank in the meantime have not equalled the
bank's transfers to him, what is the implied promise of the
bank? Beyond question it is to lend by making transfers upon
the customer's orders up to the amount of the credit balance in
the customer's ledger account, including the amount of the note
or that amount less a discount. What is the period during which
the bank assures the customer that it will make and continue
to make transfers by way of loan? In the light of the fore-
going analysis there can be no doubt that the assurance termi-
nates-the period for lending expires-on the day when the cus-
tomer's promise to repay matures. Surely the promise is not
to lend upon request at any time during the life of the cus-
tomer. Bargains to lend in the future are based on credit judg-
ments which do not look so far into the future. Again it would
be surprising to find a lender promising to make advances after
the time stipulated for repayment has arrived or to find a bank
binding itself for indefinite future periods by commitments to
lend.
In further support of the finding that the bank's promise ex-
pires by its terms on the day on which the note matures are the
same arguments from the absurdity of the legal consequences
resulting from any other finding. These were stated while there
was under discussion the assumption of a bargain in which the
customer's promise was that contained in the note and the bank's
promise unlimited in point of time.
Thus the analysis reveals the bargain underlying the note
transaction as a perfectly sensible agreement with simple and
consistent legal consequences. The bank promises and is obli-
gated to lend the agreed amount until the expiration of the
agreed period and the customer promises and is obligated to pay
at the end of that period the amount by which the transfers of
the bank exceed his transfers to it. The customer's promissory
note plays the part of collateral security for the customer's obli-
gation. This it can do, because, though it does not subject the-
36 Supra note 29.
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customer to a duty to pay the bank, the bank acquires a privi-
leged power to pledge or discount-repledge or rediscount-it for
its own obligations.
The note transaction is, therefore, in substance the familiar
British device for extending bank credit for definite periods by
means of a bargain between bank and customer obligating the
bank to honor the customer's overdrafts up to a stated amount
during a stated period and obligating the customer to pay the
debit balance at the end of that period .3  That device has been
briefly described by Hamilton:
"An advance to a customer is made by allowing him to over-
draw his account, and he is charged interest only on the variable
balance owing from day to day. The advantage to the cus-
tomer of an overdraft is that he only pays interest on the money
which he actually uses, and not upon the whole amount which
the bank may have agreed to advance to him. Moreover, every
payfiient lodged to his credit reduces the amount of the indebted-
ness upon which interest is payable.
Various arrangements are made about allowing overdrafts so
as to suit the different requirements of customers. A special
contract is sometimes entered into to allow an overdraft for a
named amount and a definite time. Where an agreement is
entered into by a bank to allow an overdraft the bank is bound
to honour the customer's cheques pursuant to the terms of the
agreement, and if it refused to do so an action might be main-
tained and heavy damages recovered for dishonourng them." 11
A transaction in the form of a loan upon or a discount of a
customer's note differs from a transaction in the form of an
agreement for an overdraft in two respects. The former yields
a credit instrument which may be of some value to the bank as
collateral 39 for its borrowings and entitles the bank to interest
upon the agreed amount during the term of the loan. The latter
may put in the hands of the bank as collateral the obligations
37 Allen v. London County & Westminster Bank, 84 L. J. K. B. 1286
(1915) ; Bank of Australasia v. Palmer, [1897] A. C. 540; Bank of Victoria
v. Brown, 1 Vict. L. R. 47 (1875); Laurie v. Scholefield, L. R. 4 C. P.
622 (1869); DAVIS, op. cit. supr. note 12, at 94; GILBART, PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF BANKING (1870) 174, 399; Grady, Use of the Trade Acceptanco
in British Domestic Business, COMMERCE REPORTS FOR JULY 22, 1919 (No.
170) 417-418; HAMIIITON, LAW AND PRACTICE OF BANKING IN AUSTRALIA
AND NE W ZEALAND (2d ed. 1900) 150-179; Interviews on Banking (1911)
REPORT NAT. MONETARY COMMISSION 135, 150, 165; MINTY, ENGLISH BANK-
ING METHODS (2d ed. 1925) 288; SHELDON, PRACTICE AND LAw OF BANK-
ING (2d ed. 1923) 444; SPALDING, BANKERS' CREDITS (1921) 9; WITHERS,
ENGLISH BANKING SYSTEM (1910) 42.
38 HAMILTON, op. cit. supra note 37, at 151-152.
30 DUNBAR, op. cit. supra note 23, at 289; GOLDENVEISER, FEDERAL RE-




of third persons which, whether negotiable or not, are not avail-
able for repledging, and entitles the bank to interest on the dif-
ference for the time being in favor of the bank on the current
account.40
It will be recalled that an entry for the amount of the cus-
tomer's time note less the amount of the discount is made on the
credit side of the individual ledger at the time of the loan.- In
most instances this entry is matched on the debit side by an entry
for the amount of the loan or for the amount of the loan plus the
discount2 In the majority of such cases the customer gives the
lending bank a "check" drawNn on and payable to it for the
amount of the loan (plus the discount, if any) .3 Obviously the
"check" for an amount equalling the amount of the ledger credit
resulting from the original credit for the loan (plus the discount,
if any) does not, and is not intended to, effect a transfer of de-
posit currency in payment of the loan. The giving of the "check"
and the making of the entry are alike pure formalities with no
legal consequences except possibly as to the amount of the dis-
count. The actual or supposed convenience of the bank in keeping
its records dictates the debit entry. The giving of the "check" is
doubtless the result of the observation that most debit entries in
the account represent tr-ansfers of the medium of exchange made
at the customer's order or request, and that the entry in question
does not. Consequently, in order to give the transaction it repre-
sents the semblance of identity with a transfer at request, the
practice of giving the "check" arose. But in a minority of such
cases "checks" are not given. Nevertheless debit entries for an
amount equalling the amount of the ledger credit (plus the dis-
count, if any) resulting from the original credit of the loan are
made. Sometimes the entry is made on the day of maturity.
Sometimes, though the ledger credit exceeds the amount of the
loan, the making of the entry is deferred.4 1 If it is postponed,
when the entry is made, at most it may be taken to signify the
bank's decision no longer to permit overdrafts. But a decision
to continue no longer the payment of checks which would result
in overdrafts seems very like a decision no longer to honor
checks which would not. Thus the debit entry is deceptively like
the exercise of a power to terminate the bank's liability to honor
checks. All this has made for confusion and the following
misconceptions have become current: first, if the "check" is
given, that the customer is paying the loan out of his ledger bal-
ance; second, if no "check" is given, that the debit entry for the
40 DAVIs, op. cit. supra note 12, at 94; supra note 37.
41Supra note 12.
42 Supra note 12.
- See the following articles in this series.
- See the following articles in this series.
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amount of the loan (plus the discount, if any) has legal conse-
quences beyond the amount of the discount; third, that apart
from the discount they are different from the legal consequences
of the debit entry made when the "check" is given; fourth, if
the debit entry is made in the absence of the "check," that the
making of the entry is the exercise by the bank of a power to
reduce by the face of the note an existing obligation to pay the
ledger balance. It is in order to give an explanation of the
fictitious anomaly of the supposed legal consequences of the debit
entry made where no "check" is given that recourse is had to
the phrase banker's lien or banker's set-off.
But for the resulting confusion the Delano and Goldstein cases
in all probability would not have been litigated. If they had,
they would not have been reasoned in terms of whether or not
the bank was invested with a legal power to set off and whether
or not the sending of a notice was an integral element in the
exercise of that power. The result reached in them, however, is
the same as that which would have been reached had the discount
transactions been subjected to the analysis proposed. While the
report of the Delano case fails to indicate whether the check was
presented on or after the day of maturity, this is immaterial as
the bank's promise expired when it opened for business on that
day and, simultaneously therewith, the customer's promise to
pay the debit balance matured. Consequently, the fact that in
the Goldstein case, the dishonored check was presented on the
morning of the day of maturity makes no difference since the
bank was no longer obligated to honor orders beyond the credit
balance of the current account.
On the other hand, it seems that the decision in the Callaham
case is contrary to the one which would have been reached if
the proposed analysis had been followed. If it be supposed,
however, that the day upon which the customer's promise to
pay the debit balance was to be performed and upon which the
bank's promise was to expire was later than the day of the
maturity of the note given as collateral-not by any means a
violent assumption if one looks beyond current practice-then
the Callahutm case may also be consistent with the suggested
analysis.
In none of the three principal cases does it appear in the re-
ports whether or not the note incorporated a provision that it
was payable at the lending bank. Had the note been in terms
payable at the lending bank that fact would afford no further
support to the Delano and Goldstein decisions. Section 87 of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law 45 may permit the bank
45 "Where the instrument is made payable at a bank it is equivalent




at which a note is made payable to debit to the maker's account
an actual transfer by it of the medium of exchange to a third
person who is the holder. 0 The presentation of the note by a
third person may subject the bank to a duty to; the customer
to pay the holder, the breach of which will give the customer
an action as in the case of a dishonored check.47 But surely the
clause will not give the customer an action in case of the bank's
failure to pay to itself the amount of the note; nor will its al-
chemy create an actual transfer of the medium of exchange to
a third person out of behavior which is neither a transfer nor to
a third person. If it be urged that, by analogy, Section 87 be
extended to give the payee bank a power to debit in cases such
as these, a conclusive answer is that there is no need to extend
it. There is no rent in the legal system through which the cases
may slip; no hiatus to be bridged. There is no debit to be
justified. The balance of transfers to and transfers by the bank
is exactly the same as it was before the so-called debit. The
obligation of the bank to honor orders is reduced because its
promise has expired. The so-called debit is a meaningless entry
in the individual ledger account made solely that that account
may indicate the total amount of the bank's obligation to honor.
Although this article is not immediately concerned with trans-
actions in which the customer gives his demand note for a loan,
it is interesting to note that, if such a transaction be viewed in
the light of the suggested analysis, a sensible underlying bargain
and convincing legal consequences are apparent. It is well
known that a demand note is the credit instrument regularly used
if the period during which the loan is expected to continue is
longer than the period of credit extension contemplated in trans-
actions in which time notes are discounted. It is equally well
known that the transaction is not one in which the bank makes
no promise to lend whatever and in which the note is simply
deposited as collateral security for such overdrafts as the bank
may see fit to allow. A reasonable inference, therefore, is that
the customer's promise is to pay upon a call or request to do so
and that the bank's promise terminates or expires upon call or
notice. This is the promise found in Dawson v. Baink of New
Zealand.4s It should be noted that this construction of the bar-
gain in no way impinges upon the rule that a demand note is due
46 Heinrich v. First National Bank, 219 N Y. 1, 113 N. E. 531 (1916);
Peoples National Bank of Middletown v. Rhoades, 28 Del. 65, 90 Atl. 409
(1913) ; Baldwin's Bank of Penn Yan v. Smith, 215 N. Y. 70, 80-82, 109
N. E. 138 (1915).
47fDirnfield v. Fourteenth Street Bank, 37 App. D. C. 11 (1911); Clark
v. Mlt. Morris Bank, 85 App. Div. 362, 83 N. Y. Supp. 447 (1st Dep't 1903),
aff'd, 181 N. Y. 533, 73 N. E. 1133 (1905); Brooke v. Tradesmen's Na-
tional Bank, 69 Hun 202, 23 N. Y. Supp. 802 (Sup. Ct., 1st Dep't 1893).
483 N. S. W. R. 154, 386 (1884).,
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and payable forthwith without demand. If collateral in the form
of a credit instrument be required where the loan agreement is
terminable upon notice, a demand note, whatever its consequent
obligations may be, in its terms more nearly conforms to the
underlying loan agreement than a time note. That the suggested
construction is correct is indicated by the fact that a contrary
contruction in the only American case 4D deciding the point was
followed by a statute attempting to override the decision20
49 Shuman v. Citizens State Bank of Rugby, 27 N. D. 599, 147 N. W.
388 (1914).
50 N. D. Comp. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1925) § 5220a: "1. It shall be un-
lawful for any bank, or trust company, with which money has been de-
posited, to charge against the deposit any claim of such bank or trust com-
pany or any other person, or to appropriate the same to the payment of
any debt to such bank or trust company or any other person, without legal
process or without the consent of the depositor.
2. Any bank or trust company which shall so charge any claim against
a deposit or in any way appropriate the same to the payment of a debt
of the depositor, in violation of the terms hereof, shall be liable to the
party aggrieved for any damages caused thereby to be recovered in a
civil action."
